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Abstract
In this paper we study hedonic coalition formation games in which players
preferences over coalitions are induced by a semi-value of a monotonic simple
game with veto control. We consider partitions of the player set in which the
winning coalition contains the union of all minimal winning coalitions, and
show that each of these partitions belongs to the strict core of the hedonic
game. Exactly such coalition structures constitute the strict core when the
simple game is symmetric. Provided that the veto player set is not a winning
coalition in a symmetric simple game, then the partition containing the grand
coalition is the unique strictly core stable coalition structure.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we address the question which players in a monotonic simple game with
veto control shouldform a winning coalition. Inspired by the work of Shenoy (1979),
we x a semi-value (i.e., a symmetric probabilistic value (cf. Weber (1988), Monderer
and Samet (2002)) for the simple game and use it to extract playerspreferences over
coalitions in a hedonic coalition formation game (cf. Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002)
and Banerjee et al. (2001)). A solution of this (and each) hedonic game is a partition
of the set of players into coalitions. In this way, we have a suitable environment in
which the question of stability can be approached. As it can be easily seen, it is not
possible a coalition structure to be stable (to be dened later) if it does not contain a
winning coalition. Hence, the answer to the question which partitions are stable is at
the same time an answer to the question which winning coalitions should form with
respect to stability concerns.
We have chosen the strict core as our stability concept for hedonic games, being
the strongest stability notion based on coalitional deviations. As it turns out, if the
winning coalition in a coalition structure contains the union of all minimal winning
coalitions, then the coalition structure belongs to the strict core of the hedonic game.
In order to fully characterize the strict core, we consider symmetric simple games
with veto control and show that the winning coalition in each strictly core stable
partition contains the union of all minimal winning coalitions. Further, provided
that the veto player set is not a winning coalition in a symmetric simple game, the
partition containing the grand coalition turns out to be the unique strictly core stable
coalition structure.
The way of modelling we follow in this paper is a stylized one since, by using
a semi-value to induce preferences over coalitions, we assume players to be purely
o¢ ce seeking. This line of study has a long tradition since Rikers (1962) classical
monograph (see Laver and Schoeld (1990) for an extensive survey). Peleg (1981) and
Einy (1985) develop a theory of coalition formation in simple games with dominant
players, whereas Carreras (1996) studies, among others, the formation of partnerships
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(cf. Kalai and Samet (1987)) in simple games. In contrast to these papers, we do not
presuppose any (additional) internal structure on the winning coalition that forms; its
internal structure is rather determined by the notion of strict core stability applied to
the induced hedonic game. More precisely, we bring together a power index (applied
to a monotonic simple game with veto control) with the notion of (strict) core stability,
arriving at the most stablewinning coalition containing the union of all minimal
winning coalitions. The methodology can of course be applied to a broader class
of problems, which leads us to a property of the simple game that appears to be
crucial. Shenoy (1979, Theorem 7.4) provides a su¢ cient condition for nonemptiness
of the core of an abstract game appropriately induced by the Shapley value (which
is the unique e¢ cient semi-value) of a proper monotonic simple game. The condition
says that the simple game should not exhibit the paradox of smaller coalitions (to be
dened later) with respect to the Shapley value. However, as we show in Section 3, a
monotonic simple game with veto control (being proper) satises Shenoys condition
with respect to the corresponding semi-value if and only if the veto player set is a
winning coalition. Thus, the classes of simple games considered by Shenoy (1979)
and in the present paper are rather complementary.
Surprisingly, up to our knowledge, situations of coalition formation involving veto
players have never been considered in the literature. One particular reason is that in a
simple game every coalition of parties which can constitute the necessary majority to
form a government is deemed as a winning coalition. However, this way of modeling
neglects many aspects a political party may consider as important when forming its
preferences over the possible governments it may be a member of  for instance,
the political views of the other members. And if these considerations are taken into
account while incorporating a government formation situation into the framework
of simple games, the resulting simple game will have a high probability to be veto-
controlled. Thats why our study provides an alternative point of view for the analysis
and explanation of government formation situations. Moreover, our results are valid
for both of two classical power indices, the Shapley-Shubik index (cf. Shapley (1953),
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Shapley and Shubik (1954)) and the Banzhaf index (cf. Bhanzaf (1965)), and also for
the whole class of semi-values which are considered by Carreras et al. (2003) as very
consistent alternatives to the mentioned classical power indices.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 includes basic notions and solution
concepts from the theory of simple games and hedonic games. The main results are
presented in Section 3. We conclude in Section 4 with some nal remarks.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Simple games
Let N be a nite set of players, which we will keep xed throughout the paper. A
transferable utility game (TU-game) with player set N is a function v : 2N ! R with
v(;) = 0. Each subset of N is a called a coalition. We denote the set of TU-games
with player set N by GN .
A game v 2 GN is monotonic if v(S)  v(T ) for every S; T 2 2N with T  S. A
player i 2 N is a null player in v if v(S [ fig) = v(S) for every S  N n fig. Players
i; j 2 N are symmetric in v, if v (S [ fig) = v (S [ fjg) for all S  N n fi; jg. Given
v 2 GN and S 2 2N , the restriction of v to S (a subgame of v) is denoted by vS and
is dened by vS(T ) = v(T ) for every T  S.
A game v 2 GN is called simple if v is monotonic, v(S) 2 f0; 1g for every S 2 2N
and v(N) = 1. We refer to a coalition S  N with v(S) = 1 as a winning coalition. A
winning coalition S is calledminimal winning if there does not exist a coalition T  S
which is winning. We denote by Wv the set of winning coalitions and byMWv the
set of minimal winning coalitions in the simple game v (cf. Shapley (1962)). Notice
that every simple game v is characterized by the set MWv of its minimal winning
coalitions.
A simple game v is proper if v(S) = 1 implies v(N n S) = 0. A player i 2 N is
a veto player in a simple game v if for all S  N , S 2 Wv implies i 2 S; the set of
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all veto players in v is denoted by veto (v). Notice that (veto (v) \ S)  veto (vS) is
valid for each S  N . The set of all monotonic simple games with veto control on
the player set N will be denoted by SN . Observe that v 2 SN implies the properness
of v.
A solution (of a TU-game) is a mapping ': GN ! RN taking each v 2 GN to
a single vector in RN , i.e., it assigns a real number 'i (v) to each player i 2 N . A
solution ' is e¢ cient if
P
i2N 'i(v) = v(N) and it is symmetric if 'i (v) = 'j (v) for
all i; j 2 N who are symmetric in v. A solution ' satises the null player property if
'i(v) = 0 for all i 2 N who are null players in v.
An e¢ cient, symmetric solution satisfying the null player property is the Shapley
value (cf. Shapley (1953), Shapley and Shubik (1954)) Sh : GN  ! RN dened by
Shi(v) :=
X
SNnfig
jSj!(jN j   jSj   1)!
jN j! (v(S [ fig)  v(S)) (i 2 N):
A probabilistic value also assigns to each player an average of his marginal con-
tributions and hence, it keeps an essential feature of the Shapley value. However, it
might fail to satisfy either e¢ ciency or symmetry. To be more precise, let P iN denote
the set of probability distributions on 2Nnfig, the family of coalitions not containing
i. A solution F : GN  ! RN is called a probabilistic value (cf. Weber (1988)) if for
every v 2 GN and i 2 N ,
Fi(v) =
X
TNnfig
pi(T ) (v(T [ fig)  v(T )) ;
where pi 2 P iN can be interpreted as player is subjective evaluation of the probability
of joining di¤erent coalitions. For instance, the probabilistic value which is dened
by pi(T ) = 1jN j
 jN j 1
jT j
 1
, i 2 N , is the Shapley value and the one which is dened
by pi(T ) = 1
2jNj 1 , i 2 N , is the Banzhaf value (cf. Banzhaf (1965)). A symmetric
probabilistic value is called a semi-value (cf. Monderer and Samet (2002)). The set
of all semi-values on GN is denoted by F .
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2.2 Hedonic games
For each player i 2 N we denote by Ni = fX  N j i 2 Xg the collection of all
coalitions containing i. A partition  of N is called a coalition structure. For each
coalition structure  and each player i 2 N , we denote by (i) the coalition in 
containing player i, i.e., (i) 2  and i 2 (i). The set of all coalition structures of
N will be denoted by CN .
Further, we assume that each player i 2 N is endowed with a preference i over
Ni, i.e., a binary relation over Ni which is reexive, complete, and transitive. Denote
by i and i the strict and indi¤erence relation associated with i and by := (1
; : : : ;n) a prole of preferences i for all i 2 N . A players preference relation over
coalitions canonically induces a preference relation over coalition structures in the
following way: For any two coalition structures  and 0, player i weakly prefers
 to 0 if and only if he weakly prefers his coalition in  to the one in 0, i.e.,
 i 0 if and only if (i) i 0(i). Hence, we assume that playerspreferences over
coalition structures are purely hedonic, i.e., they are completely characterized by their
preferences over coalitions. Finally, a hedonic game (N;) is a pair consisting of the
set of players and a preference prole.
Unlike solution concepts for (simple) cooperative games do, there is no worth to
distribute in hedonic games. The relevant question is rather, which coalition structure
should form, taking playerspreferences into account. The basic property that we
require is strict core stability.
Given a hedonic game (N;), a partition  of N is strictly core stable for (N;),
if there does not exist a nonempty coalition X such that X i (i) holds for all i 2 X
and X j (j) is true for some player j 2 X.  is core stable if there does not exist a
nonempty coalition X such that X i (i) holds for each i 2 X. Put in other words,
a coalition structure  is strictly core stable if no group of players are willing to form
a coalition, so that each player is at least as well o¤ with this new coalition and
some player is better o¤ compared to the corresponding coalitions in . Clearly, a
weaker notion of coalitional deviation is incorporated in the denition of core stability
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- everyone in the deviating coalition should be better o¤. Observe that strict core
stability implies core stability. In what follows, we denote by SC (N;) the set of all
strictly core stable coalition structures of a hedonic game (N;). Alternatively, we
call SC (N;) the strict core of (N;).
3 Coalition formation
Given a game v 2 SN and a semi-value F 2 F , we dene a hedonic game (N;) by
inducing playerspreferences over coalitions in the following way (cf. Shenoy (1979),
Dimitrov and Haake (2005)). For each i 2 N and for all S; T 2 Ni,
S i T if and only if Fi (vS)  Fi (vT ) : (1)
According to (1), player is preferences over any two coalitions S and T he may
be a member of are induced by is semi-value in the simple game restricted to S
and T , respectively. Notice that paying attention to the corresponding coalitions is
compatible with the very denition of a hedonic game - each player in such a game
evaluates any two coalition structures based only on his preferences over the coalitions
in the two partitions he belongs to (cf. Aumann and Dréze (1974), Shenoy (1979)).
3.1 Strict core existence
We now turn to the question whether there exist strictly core stable coalition struc-
tures for hedonic games induced as in (1). For v 2 SN , let
Pv := fS  N j S  ([S02MWvS 0)g
and
CPvN :=

 2 CN j  \Pv 6= ;	 :
In other words, the set CPvN consists of all coalition structures containing a winning
coalition which includes all minimal winning coalitions. Our main result in this
7
paper states that all coalition structures from CPvN are strictly core stable. In order
to present this result, we need the characterization of semi-values dened on games
with nite support provided by Dubey et al. (1981).
Theorem (Dubey et al. (1981), Theorem 1(a)) Let U be an innite set of players and
  denote the space of all TU-games on U with a nite carrier. Then F is a semi-value
on   if and only if there exists a Borel probability measure P on [0; 1] such that for
every nite coalition N and for every v 2   with carrier N , F (v) = FP(v), where
FP;i(v) =
X
SNnfig
jN j(jSj) (v(T [ fig)  v(T )) ; i 2 N (2)
with
jN j(jSj) =
Z 1
0
tjSj(1  t)(jN j jSj 1)dP(t): (3)
Moreover, the correspondence P ! FP is one-to-one.
Taking into account the above characterization, the following two lemmas will be
helpful.
Lemma 1 Let v 2 SN , F 2 F , T 2 Wv n fNg and j 2 N n T . Then, Fi
 
vT[fjg
 
Fi (vT ) for each i 2 veto(v).
Proof. For Q  N , let MW vQ denote the set of all minimal winning coalitions in v
that are contained in Q. Observe that MW vT[fjg  MW vT and let i 2 veto(v). We
have by (2),
Fi(vT[fjg) =
P
fQ(T[fjg)nfigjv(Q)=0;v(Q[fig)=1g 
jT j+1(jQj)
and
Fi(vT ) =
P
fQTnfigjv(Q)=0;v(Q[fig)=1g 
jT j(jQj):
We establish the inequality Fi(vT[fjg)  Fi(vT ) by rst showing that A  B [ C,
where the sets A, B, and C are dened as follows:
A := fQ  (T [ fjg) n fig j v(Q) = 0; v(Q [ fig) = 1g ;
B := fQ  T n fig j v(Q) = 0; v(Q [ fig) = 1g;
C := f(Q [ fjg)  (T [ fjg) n fig j Q 2 Bg:
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Let R 2 B[C. If R 2 B, then R is obviously a member ofA. Suppose now that R 2 C.
Then, there exists R0 2 B such that R = R0 [ fjg. Moreover, R is a losing coalition
since i 62 R is a veto player. We have also R [ fig 2 Wv by R0 [ fig 2 Wv and the
monotonicity of v. Hence, R 2 A which implies A  B[C. Furthermore, it can easily
be observed that the inclusion is strict, i.e., A  B[C, whenMW vT[fjg MW vT , and
A = B [ C when MW vT[fjg =MW vT .
Then,
Fi(vT[fjg) =
P
Q2A 
jT j+1(jQj)
 PQ2B[C jT j+1(jQj)
=
P
Q2B
h
jT j+1(jQj) + jT j+1(jQj+ 1)
i
=
P
Q2B[
R 1
0
tjQj(1  t)(jT j+1 jQj 1)dP(t)+R 1
0
tjQj+1(1  t)(jT j+1 (jQj+1) 1)dP(t)]
=
P
Q2B[
R 1
0
tjQj(1  t)(jT j jQj 1)dP(t)]
=
P
Q2B 
jT j(jQj)
= Fi(vT )
where the third equality follows from (3) and hence, the assertion follows. Notice
that the inequality is strict when MW vT[fjg  MW vT and Fi(vT[fjg) = Fi(vT ) when
MW vT[fjg =MW
v
T .
Lemma 2 Let v 2 SN , F 2 F and S = [S02MWvS 0. Then, for each T  N ,
Fi (vS)  Fi (vT ) for each i 2 veto(v).
Proof. Let T  N . If T is a losing coalition, by the monotonicity of v, we are done.
Obviously, MW vT =MW
v
S for every T  S. Then, by Lemma 1,
Fi (vT ) = Fi (vS) for each i 2 S and each T  S: (4)
So, assume that T 2 Wv and T + S, and let j 2 N n T . In view of the proof
of Lemma 1, Fi
 
vT[fjg

= Fi (vT ) for each i 2 veto(v) if MW vT[fjg = MW vT , and
Fi
 
vT[fjg

> Fi (vT ) for each i 2 veto(v) if MW vT[fjg  MW vT . Consider a sequence
of players j1; : : : ; j` such that fj1; : : : ; j`g = S n T ; thus, T [ fj1; : : : ; j`g  S. Notice
that, by the denition of S, there is k 2 f0; : : : ; `   1g such that MW vT[fj1;:::;jk+1g 
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MW vT[fj1;:::;jkg (if k = 0, we set T [ fj1; : : : ; j0g = T ). Then, by (4) and the repeated
use of Lemma 1,
Fi(vS) = Fi(vT[fj1;:::;j`g)  Fi(vT[fj1;:::;j` 1g)  : : :  Fi
 
vT[fj1;:::;jk+1g

> Fi
 
vT[fj1;:::;jkg
  : : :  Fi(vT )
for each i 2 veto(v).
We are ready now to present our strict core existence result.
Proposition 1 Let v 2 SN , F 2 F and (N;) be induced as in (1). Then, CPvN 
SC (N;).
Proof. Let  be a partition of N containing S = [S02MWvS 0. Since CPvN 
SC (N;) follows easily by Lemma 2 if  2 SC (N;), we proceed by showing the
strict core stability of .
If MWv = fveto(v)g, then each player in N n veto(v) is a null player in v (and
thus, in each of its corresponding subgames). Hence, there is no coalition T 2 2N n
that makes any of its members strictly better o¤ in comparison to the corresponding
coalitions in .
Suppose now thatMWv 6= fveto(v)g and to the contrary, let there be a (winning)
coalition T  N such that
Fi (vT )  Fi
 
v(i)

for each i 2 T (5)
and
Fj (vT ) > Fj
 
v(j)

for some j 2 T: (6)
Consider the following two possible cases:
Case 1 : S  T . By (4), Fi (vT ) = Fi (vS) for each i 2 S and each T  S. Hence,
Fi (vT ) = Fi
 
v(i)

= Fi (vS) for each i 2 S\T , i.e., (6) should hold for some j 2 T nS.
Notice however that, by the monotonicity of v, (6) implies Fj (vT ) > 0 which is, since
j 2 N n S is a null player in v (and thus, in vT ), a contradiction to Fj (vT ) = 0.
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Case 2 : S * T . In view of the proof of Lemma 2, we have Fi
 
v(i)

= Fi(vS) > Fi(vT )
for each i 2 veto(v)  T , a contradiction to (5).
We would like nally to mention that, given a simple game with veto control,
inducing a hedonic game by a semi-value (as in (1)) is crucial for the nonemptiness
of the strict core. Our rst example illustrates this point.
Example 1 Let N = f1; 2; 3g and the game v 2 SN be given by its minimal winning
coalitionsMWv = f12; 13g. Let ' be a solution such that
'1 (vS) =
8<: 12 if S 2 f12; 13; 123g ;0 otherwise.
'2 (vS) =
8>><>>:
1
2
if S = 12;
3
8
if S = 123;
0 otherwise.
'3 (vS) =
8>><>>:
1
2
if S = 13;
3
8
if S = 123;
0 otherwise.
Notice that ' is ine¢ cient since '1 (v) +'2 (v) +'3 (v) 6= 1. Let us rst show that '
is not a semi-value. If the opposite were the case, then, by (2),
'i(v) =
X
SNnfig
jN j(jSj) (v(T [ fig)  v(T )) ; i 2 N:
Since '2 (v) = 
jN j(jf1gj) = 3
8
, jN j(1) must be equal to 3
8
. But then '1 (v) =
jN j(jf2gj) + jN j(jf3gj) + jN j(jf2; 3gj)  6
8
contradicting with '1 (v) =
1
2
. Hence, '
is not a semi-value.
Taking the payo¤s according to ' to extract preferences over coalitions, the players
evaluate coalitions as follows:
12 1 13 1 123 1 1:
12 2 123 2 2 2 23:
13 3 123 3 3 3 23:
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Collecting all preferences, we obtain a hedonic game (N;) with preferences induced
by '. Inspecting (N;), one nds that SC (N;) = ;.
3.2 Symmetric games
Notice that the inverse inclusion to the one in Proposition 1 can be proved only in
very special cases. For instance, it is easy to show that if either veto(v) 2 Wv or
jN j  3, then CPvN = SC (N;). However, in general and as exemplied next, the
strict core might be strictly larger than CPvN .
Example 2 Let N = f1; 2; 3; 4g and the game v 2 SN be given by its minimal
winning coalitionsMWv = f12; 134g. Playerspayo¤s according to the Shapley value
are
Sh1 (vS) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
7
12
if S = N;
1
2
if S 2 f12; 123; 124g ;
1
3
if S = 134;
0 otherwise.
Sh2 (vS) =
8>><>>:
1
2
if S 2 f12; 123; 124g ;
3
12
if S = N;
0 otherwise.
Sh3 (vS) =
8>><>>:
1
3
if S = 134;
1
12
if S = N;
0 otherwise.
Sh4 (vS) =
8>><>>:
1
3
if S = 134;
1
12
if S = N;
0 otherwise,
Taking this to extract preferences over coalitions, the players evaluate coalitions as
follows:
1234 1 12 1 123 1 124 1 134 1 1 1 13 1 14:
12 2 123 2 124 2 1234 2 2 2 23 2 24 2 234:
134 3 1234 3 3 3 13 3 23 3 34 3 123 3 234:
134 4 1234 4 4 4 14 4 24 4 34 4 124 4 234:
Collecting all preferences, we obtain a hedonic game (N;). Inspecting (N;), one
nds that CPvN = ff1234gg  ff1234g ; f12; 34g ; f12; 3; 4gg = SC (N;).
In order to provide a full characterization of the strict core of the induced hedonic
game, we will require the underlying simple game to be symmetric. Recall that v 2 SN
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is symmetric, if S 2 Wv implies T 2 Wv for each coalition T with veto (v)  T and
jT j = jSj.
Proposition 2 Let v 2 SN be symmetric, F 2 F and (N;) be induced as in (1).
Then, SC (N;) = CPvN .
Proof. In view of Proposition 1 it is enough to show that if a partition  contains a
winning coalition T =2 Pv, then  =2 SC (N;).
Notice rst that by T =2 Pv, we have T 6= N . Let j 2 N n T and i 2 T n veto(v)
(such an i exists since, otherwise, T 2 Wv and T n veto(v) = ; would imply T 2 Pv).
Consider the coalition T 0 = (T n fig) [ fjg. By the symmetry of v, all non-veto
players in T are symmetric in vT and all non-veto players in T 0 are symmetric in
vT 0. Hence, by jT j = jT 0j, Fi (vT 0) = Fi (vT ) = Fi
 
v(i)

for each i 2 T 0 n fjg, and
Fj (vT 0) > 0 = Fj
 
v(j)

. It follows then that T 0 is a deviation (in the sense of the
strict core) from  and thus,  =2 SC (N;).
The case in which the monotonic simple game v is proper and symmetric was
also analyzed by Shenoy (1979)1. In his Theorem 7.6, he shows that the core of
the hedonic game (induced as in (1) with F = Sh) consists in this case only of
partitions containing a minimal winning coalition with minimal cardinality. Consider
for instance the game (N; v) with N = f1; 2; 3g and MWv = f12; 13; 23g. If the
hedonic game is induced as in (1) with F = Sh, then the reader can easily check
that the core of the game consists of the following three partitions: f12; 3g, f13; 2g,
f23; 1g. Notice however that, in contrast to Proposition 1, neither of these partitions
is strictly core stable.
Finally, we show that the partition containing the grand coalition is the most
stable coalition structure if veto(v) =2 Wv.
Corollary 1 Let v 2 SN be symmetric, F 2 F and (N;) be induced as in (1). If
veto(v) =2 Wv, then SC (N;) = ffNgg.
1 In this work, a monotonic simple game v is dened to be symmetric if S 2 Wv implies T 2 Wv
for each coalition T with jT j = jSj. Notice that, with this denition of symmetry, a player has veto
power in v if and only if Wv = fNg.
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Proof. It follows from veto(v) =2 Wv that there is a player i 2 N n veto(v) who
belongs to a minimal winning coalition. Hence, by the symmetry of v, each player
from N n veto(v) is member of a minimal winning coalition; thus, [S02MWvS 0 = N .
In view of the proof of Proposition 1, SC (N;) = ffNgg.
3.3 Veto games and the paradox of smaller coalitions
As already mentioned, the strict core of a hedonic game is the strongest stability
notion based on coalitional deviations. Another possibility, pursued by Shenoy (1979),
is to consider the weaker notion of the core. In his Theorem 7.4, Shenoy (1979) shows
that if playerspreferences over coalitions are induced as in (1) with F = Sh, and
the simple game does not exhibit the paradox of smaller coalitions with respect to
the Shapley value, then the core is nonempty. More precisely, a simple game v does
not exhibit the paradox of smaller coalitions w.r.t. a cooperative solution concept ',
if for all S; T 2 Wv, S  T implies 'i (vS)  'i (vT ) for all i 2 S. The absence of
this paradox in simple games respects the fact that if players form a smaller winning
coalition, then their power (as measured by ') should not decrease since there are
fewer players to share the same amount of power. It is worth mentioning that Table
A.1 in Shenoy (1979) lists all monotonic and proper simple games with up to four
players and veries presence or absence of the paradox with respect to the Shapley
value. In what follows, we present the conditions under which the paradox of smaller
coalitions w.r.t. a semi-value F 2 F is not present in a monotonic simple game with
veto control.
Proposition 3 Let v 2 SN , F 2 F and (N;) be induced as in (1). The game v does
not exhibit the paradox of smaller coalitions w.r.t. F if and only if MWv = fveto(v)g.
Proof. LetMWv = fveto(v)g and take R; T 2 Wv with T  R. Then, Fi (vR) 
Fi (vT ) for each i 2 R follows easily from Lemma 2 by noticing that all players in
T n veto(v) are null players in v.
Suppose next that v does not exhibit the paradox of smaller coalitions with respect
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to F . We show that jMWvj  2 leads to a contradiction.
Let S1; S2 2 MWv, S1 6= S2 and  be a partition containing S = [S02MWvS 0.
Since S1  S and v does not exhibit the paradox w.r.t. F ,
Fi (vS1)  Fi (vS) for each i 2 S1: (7)
Since S2 2MWv with S2 6= S1, it follows from Lemma 2 that Fi(vS) > Fi(vS1) in
contradiction to (7).
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we focussed on the stability of coalition structures containing the union
of all minimal winning coalitions (or one of its supersets) in simple games with veto
control. An important question about any stable coalition structure is whether there
exists a natural coalition formation dynamics which ensures the formation of that
coalition structure. For instance, Çiftçi et al. (2006) considers bilateral agreements
as an important coalition formation procedure in voting/government formation situ-
ations. This work focuses on the Shapley value as an appropriate measure of voting
power and analyzes, inspired by Sprumont (1990), the existence of sequences of bi-
lateral agreements that are population monotonic in the sense that each players
voting power does not decrease as the coalition to which he belongs grows through
the agreements in the sequence. As a result, these authors show that starting from
any coalition structure which does not contain any winning coalition, there exists a
sequence of population monotonic bilateral agreements among the elements of the
starting coalition structure which results in the formation of the union of all minimal
winning coalitions (or one of its supersets) if and only if the set of veto players in the
simple game is nonempty. Moreover, if the set of veto players is a winning coalition
(SC (N;) = CPvN), then every such sequence results in the formation of the set of
veto players (or one of its supersets).
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